The parallel impacts of political, social, and economic developments in Iran are pushing the country toward the inevitable moment when Iranian society must resolve its fate with the tyrannical regime of the mullahs.
The regime itself continually notes this thought in the mirror of the country’s political, social, and economic events and is deeply afraid of its implications. In their statements and writings, the regime’s political commentators and economic experts describe the alarming state of the government’s political and economic fate, offering constant warnings.
Former interior minister Mousavi Lari said, ” [President Masoud] Pezehkiyan was the last arrow left in the regime’s quiver, and if even this fails, I say it will be catastrophic. ”
What is the source of this catastrophe that this regime official refers to but does not name? Is it internal to the regime, or is it the political, social, and economic record of the regime in the eyes of the Iranian people that has reached a catastrophic stage?
And could “the last arrow in the quiver” be anything other than a sign of the regime’s dead-end in the face of the ever-growing demands of Iranian society and the regime Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s clear failure in his various projects and the purification strategy? It also indicates that, after Ebrahim Raisi, Khamenei no longer has any players left within the regime.
It is evident that the regime’s religious policies have reached a complete deadlock against social modernity, which represents the fundamental right of citizenship in politics, society, and the economy, and the regime has resorted to using the “last arrow in its quiver”.
The question is, what catalysts have accelerated the regime’s deadlock, both internally and externally? Could political, social, and economic developments concerning a regime or government automatically lead to a “deadlock” and a “catastrophe,” forcing the regime to reach for its last arrow? Never. In fact, this process follows a very predictable pattern until it reaches its conclusion.
Descriptive and analytical phrases about this have been written and recalled repeatedly over the years and months, and now two key periods can be highlighted:
- 1. The continuity of regime crimes from the 1980s to the 2009 uprising and then the acceleration of uprisings against the regime leading up to September 2022.
- 2. The explosion of the 2022 uprising, triggered by the misogynistic crime of killing Mahsa Amini, and the subsequent nationwide and societal uprising. This uprising had significant strategic impacts, as it rallied most of the society against the entire regime. The maximum boycotts of the three staged elections in March 2024, May 2024, and July 2024 were also a result of the strategic impact of the 2022 uprising.
These two periods must be seen as the logical process leading to the inevitable final battle between most of the Iranian society and the ruling regime. These two periods should always be considered as the most significant political events in understanding the nature of the relationship between society and the regime, as well as the basis for understanding the course of future developments until the inevitable overthrow of the regime.
Relying on this legal process, there is no doubt that the “disaster” against the regime will always accelerate, while the regime no longer has any “arrows in its quiver,” and all its political capital has been exhausted.
Now, Khamenei’s dream of returning to a model like Raisi has turned into a nightmare and a source of torment; both in dealing with social and labor crises and repressing them, in continuing purges, and in bearing the costs of regional terrorism and warmongering.
In contrast, the Iranian people grow stronger by the day and grow more prepared for the ultimate overthrow of the clerical occupiers.